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Observations on Vessel Release under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea
Bernard H. Oxman*
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law
ABSTRACT
If a foreign ship is detained by a coastal or port state, the flag state may contest the legality
of the detention and submit the case to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the
general dispute settlement provisions of the Convention. Article 292 sets up a more
circumscribed, additional procedure for vessel release. It does not entail the submission of a
dispute on the merits to a court or tribunal for judgment. The matter must be dealt with
"without delay". Articles 294 and 295 are arguably not relevant. Local proceedings are
unaffected and local remedies need not be exhausted. Application can be made "by or on
behalf' of the flag state. The text provides an alternative. The words "on behalf of" present
an option that is not already provided by the word "by". Therefore, these words should be
understood to permit the flag state to dispense with the need for official communication
from its government in connection with each application for release, such as is necessary for
an application "by" the flag state. Instead, the state may designate in advance natural or
judicial persons (e.g. owners or operators), who are authorized to bring applications for
release on its behalf. Since no application for release "on behalf of the flag State" may be
made against its will, the flag state may change, qualify or withdraw its designations at any
time. While there is no doubt that the German Government will permit parties before the
Tribunal to be represented by counsel of their choice, without regard to the country in which
counsel is licensed to practise law, the question remains whether foreign counsel will be
permitted to maintain an office in Hamburg even when they are not working on a case
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. This is, however, less a question of
Germany's international obligations, than a question of whether Germany wishes to
promote the idea that Hamburg is a global centre for legal activity related to the Law of the
Sea.

The author served as US Representative to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea and as chairman of the English Language Group of the Conference Drafting
Committee, and participated in all substantive sessions of the Conference. The views expressed
herein are his own.
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Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' introduced major
changes in the international law of the sea, particularly when compared with the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Among the most important
changes are the expanded competences granted to coastal states. In particular,
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone represents a dramatic geographic and
functional expansion of coastal state jurisdiction bringing a third of the marine
environment within the limits of coastal state jurisdiction.
The expansion of coastal state competences is balanced in two ways to protect
the interests of other states and the collective interests of all states. First, the
Convention contains limitations on the geographic and functional scope of these
competences and on the manner in which they may be exercised. Secondly,
subject to certain exceptions, the Convention requires arbitration or adjudication
of disputes not settled by other means.
Coastal State Enforcement Competence
Detention or arrest of foreign ships is a particularly sensitive matter. It affects
the right to communicate, which is central to the security and well-being of most
if not all peoples including, but by no means limited to, those of the flag state.
This issue is addressed in detail in several contexts in the Convention. 2 Two are
of particular interest for purposes of this study. The first concerns the power of
the coastal state to "take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws
and regulations adopted by it" with respect to the exploration, exploitation,
conservation and management of living resources in the exclusive economic
zone. 3 The second concerns the power of the port state or the coastal state to
enforce national or international regulations regarding pollution of the marine
environment.4
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, UN
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), and
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, opened for signature
29 July 1994, appended to GA Res. 48/263 (28 July 1994), reprinted US Senate Treaty Doc. 1032

39 (1994) (hereinafter cited as the Convention).
With some elaboration, Arts. 100-107, 110 and 111 of the Convention repeat the provisions of
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas with respect to piracy, the right of visit, and hot pursuit.
Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 UST 2312, TIAS 5200, 450 UNTS 82. A new
provision is added with respect to unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas: Convention,
Art. 109. Although drawn from the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Arts. 60 and 80, as

well as Arts. 258 to 262, represent a substantial elaboration of the competence of the coastal
state with respect to offshore installations and structures: Convention on the Continental Shelf,
29 April 1958, 15 UST 471, TIAS 5578, 499 UNTS 311. Most of the provisions regarding coastal
state competence over marine scientific research are new: Convention, Arts. 245, 252, 253. Other
3 examples are identified in notes 3, 9, 10 and 11 below, and the text annotated.
Convention, Art. 73(1).
4 See notes 9, 10 and 11 below.
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Especially close attention is paid to the latter problem when a state is accorded
enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships with respect to pollution in areas
where all ships enjoy navigation rights and freedoms, including innocent
7
passage,5 transit passage, 6 archipelagic sea lanes passage, and freedom of
navigation. 8 Pursuant to the Convention, there is at least some coastal state
enforcement competence over foreign ships with respect to vessel-source
pollution in internal waters, archipelagic waters, the territorial sea, straits used
9
for international navigation, and the e:clusive economic zone. With respect to
pollution from sea-bed activities or from dumping, coastal state enforcement
competence embraces all of these areas as well as the continental shelf beyond the
exclusive economic zone. 10 The Convention also preserves the right of the coastal
state to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea following upon a
to result
collision or other maritime casualty which may reasonably be expected
11
in major harmful consequences to its coastline or related interests.
Limitations and Vessel Release
In both contexts, the Convention sets forth substantive and procedural
limitations on enforcement competence over foreign ships. These are relatively
12
brief with respect to fishing in the exclusive economic zone. Because of the
impact on the rights and freedoms of navigation enjoyed by all states, there are
extensive limitations not only on prescriptive competence but on enforcement
competence with respect to protection and preservation of the marine
environment. 13
Moreover, in both contexts, the provisions regarding the exercise of
enforcement competence contain specific duties regarding vessel release. The
provisions on vessel release accommodate economic and humanitarian as well as
safety and environmental concerns. Detention of a ship and its crew can be costly
to the owner or operator of the ship, to its crew and to those whose exports or
imports are affected. Detention of crew members in a state with whose language
and culture they may have little or no connection can impose severe strain and
5 There is a right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, internal waters formed by straight
baselines, archipelagic waters, and certain straits. See Convention, Arts. 8(2), 17, 45, 52.
6 Transit passage applies in most straits used for international navigation between areas of high
seas or exclusive economic zones. See Convention, Arts. 35-38.
8 See Convention, Art. 53.
8
Freedom of navigation applies in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond. See
Convention, Arts. 58, 86, 87.
9 Convention, Arts. 2, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 41, 42, 49, 52-54, 56, 211, 214, 216, 218, 220, 233, 234.
10 Convention, Arts. 208, 210, 214, 216.

11 Convention, Art. 221. See International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 29 November 1969, 26 UST 765, TIAS 8068.
12 Convention, Art. 73.
13 Many of these are to be found in Section 1 and Sections 5 to 10 of Part XII on Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment. But other provisions of the Convention may also
contain relevant limitations. See Convention, Arts. 21(2), 22(3), 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 41, 42, 44,
45, 52, 53, 54, 56(2), 58(2), 78, 92(l), 95-97, 110, 111, 135, 141, 147(1), 300-302.
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hardship on them and their families. Little is accomplished, and some haria may
be done, by dumping large quantities of spoiled fish. Particularly in the case of
large tankers that are difficult to stop or manoeuvre, or other ships carrying
hazardous cargo, citation or formal arrest at sea for jurisdictional purposes and
release on bond while the ship continues on its way without detention is often the
best means to avoid a serious safety and environmental hazard.
Article 73, which deals with coastal state enforcement of fishing regulations in
the exclusive economic zone, provides in paragraph 2: "Arrested vessels and their
crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other
security."
With respect to enforcement of pollution regulations applicable to foreign
ships, Article 226(l)(a) provides, "states shall not delay a foreign vessel longer
than is essential for purposes of the investigations provided for in articles 216,
218 and 220." Article 216 deals with enforcement with respect to pollution by
dumping. Article 218 deals with enforcement by a port state "in respect of any
discharge ... outside the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic
zone of that State". Article 220 deals with enforcement by a coastal state with
respect to vessel-source pollution in the territorial sea or the exclusive economic
zone of that state. 14 Moreover, straits states that take enforcement measures with
respect to foreign ships pursuant to Article 233 "must respect mutatis mutandis
the provisions of' Part XII, section 7, which includes Article 226.15
14

15

In the context of Art. 220 and other provisions' of Part XII, the reference to the territorial sea
logically may be read to include ships in innocent passage not only in the territorial sea but in
other waters in which there is a right of innocent passage, namely archipelagic waters and
internal waters enclosed by straight baselines. (See note 5 above.)
Article 233 deals with enforcement of regulations regarding transit passage adopted pursuant to
Art. 42. Article 42 applies mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage by virtue of Art. 54.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that archipelagic states may take enforcement measures
authorized by Art. 233 with respect to foreign ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage.
The precise effect of Art. 233 on those straits in which the applicable regime is nonsuspendable innocent passage pursuant to Art. 45, has no bearing on the application of section
7, including Art. 226, which must be respected with respect to pollution enforcement measures
against foreign ships under both Arts. 220 and 233.
While Art. 226 does not expressly refer to coastal state enforcement competence under Art.
234 in ice-covered areas, there appears to be no logical explanation for the omission of a crossreference other than mere oversight. There was no suggestion during the negotiation of Art. 234
that the duty to release an arrested vessel on bond would not apply, either directly or by virtue of
incorporation into the duty under Art. 234 to have due regard to navigation. Article 234 was
closely negotiated by the Canadian, Soviet and US delegations under intense political and
military scrutiny, and was added relatively late in the negotiation of Part XII, after the drafting
of the section 7 safeguards was largely completed by the Third Committee of the Conference.
The essence of the political accommodation was to draft an article granting special competence
to the coastal state for the control of pollution from ships navigating in ice-covered areas, to
place the article in a new section of its own in order to make clear that it was not in a section
from which Art. 233 excludes straits, and to ensure that this special competence was subject to
the warship exclusion contained in Art. 236. The political sensitivity of the issue was such that
little if any attention 'was paid to technical drafting questions, including the question of ensuring
precise textual harmonization with various other provisions, either from a maritime perspective
or (with respect to Art. 21(2) for example) from a coastal perspective. Even the clause "within
the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone", which logically should confirm that the special

OBSERVATIONS ON VESSEL RELEASE

205

Paragraph l(b) of Article 226 goes on to provide: "If the investigation
indicates a violation of applicable laws and regulations or international rules and
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, release
shall be made promptly subject to reasonable procedures such as bonding or
other appropriate financial security." However, paragraph l(c) adds an
important qualification:
"Without prejudice to applicable international rules and standards relating
to the seaworthiness of vessels,' 6 the release of a vessel may, whenever it
would present an unreasonable threat of damage to the marine environment, be refused or made conditional upon proceeding to the nearest
appropriate repair yard. Where release has been refused or made
conditional, the flag State of the vessel must be promptly' 7notified, and
may seek release of the vessel in accordance with Part XV.'
These vessel release provisions of course contemplate enforcement proceedings
against the vessel or members of the crew in the courts of the detaining state. The
purpose of the bond or security is to protect against failure to appear and pay the
applicable penalty. In this connection it should be borne in mind that Article
73(3) prohibits imprisonment (absent agreement to the contrary) or any other
form of corporal punishment for violation of fisheries laws and regulations by a
foreign vessel in the exclusive economic zone. Similarly, Article 230 provides that
only monetary penalties may be imposed for pollution violations by foreign
vessels within or beyond the territorial sea, except in the case of a wilful and
serious act of pollution in the territorial sea. It should also be noted that Article
229 declares: "Nothing in this Convention affects the institution of civil
proceedings in respect of any claim for loss or damage resulting from pollution of
the marine environment."
Compulsory Arbitration or Adjudication
The relationship between these limitations and the requirements for arbitration
or adjudication of disputes under section 2 of Part XV of the Convention is
competence over foreign navigation applies both in the exclusive economic zone and in waters
landward of the exclusive economic zone, is not drafted as well as the clause "in all waters
landward of the outer limits of its Exclusive Economic Zone" that appears in Art. 66 on the
regulation of fishing for anadromous species, notwithstanding the major roles played by the
16 same three delegations in the negotiation of Art. 66.
Article 219 sets forth the duties of port states with respect to the seaworthiness of vessels.

(Footnote added.)
While the problem addressed by this qualification is more readily imagined in the case of a vessel
arrested for a pollution violation (e.g. a tanker carrying hazardous cargo), it might also arise in
the case of a vessel arrested for a fishing violation. While the qualification does not apply
literally in the latter case, an international tribunal convinced that a fishing vessel poses an
unreasonable threat of damage to the marine environment is unlikely to order the vessel to be
released with no assurance that the threat will be mitigated. That conclusion might be rooted in
Art. 192, which sets forth the basic duty of all states to protect and preserve the marine
environment, or in the duties of the flag state under Art. 217.
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central to the overall balance achieved. Subject to certain exceptions, any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, not settled by
be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute" to
other means, "shall ...
the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the Convention. 8 For this
purpose, states may file declarations choosing the new International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea established by the Convention, the International Court of
Justice, arbitration or, for enumerated types of disputes, a special form of
arbitration. 19 If the parties have accepted the same procedure, it may be
submitted only to that procedure except as otherwise agreed. 20 If the parties have
not accepted the same procedure, or if the dispute is not covered by a declaration
21
in force for one of the parties, arbitration is the applicable procedure.
The section 2 procedures apply only to parties to the Convention,2 except as
otherwise provided in the Convention or some other agreement.2 Moreover, if
the parties to the dispute have agreed in another instrument that such dispute
shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that
entails a binding decision, that procedure applies in lieu of the procedures
provided for in Part XV unless otherwise agreed.2 4
Limitations
Paragraph 1 of Article 297 enumerates the circumstances in which disputes with
regard to the exercise by a coastal state of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction are
subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication under section 2; they may be
summarized as follows:
" alleged coastal state violations of provisions regarding freedoms and rights of
navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and related
uses;
" alleged flag state violations in the exercise of such freedoms, rights and uses;
or
" alleged coastal state violations of specified international rules and standards
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
In addition, pursuant to Article 298(l)(b), a state may, if it wishes, file a written
declaration that it does not accept compulsory arbitration or adjudication under
section 2 with respect to "disputes concerning law enforcement activities in
Convention, Art. 286.
19 Convention, Art. 287(1).
20 Convention, Art. 287(4).
21 Convention, Art. 287(3) and 287(5).
22 Only states and certain other entities with international juridical personality, such as the
European Community and self-governing associated states, may be party to the Convention:
Convention, Arts. 305-307; Ann. IX.
23 In this connection, it may be recalled that only states may be parties to cases before the
International Court of Justice: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34(1).
24 Convention, Art. 282.
18
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regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3". The
absence of a cross-reference to paragraph 1 of Article 297 was deliberate.
Paragraph 2 of Article 297 relates to marine scientific research; paragraph 3
provides that "the coastal state shall not be obliged to accept the submission to
[arbitration or adjudication under section 2] of any dispute relating to its
sovereign rights with respect
to the living resources in the exclusive economic
25
zone or their exercise."
The import of these provisions is that coastal state enforcement competence
over foreign ships for pollution enforcement purposes is not excluded, or subject
to exclusion, from compulsory arbitration or adjudication, especially where that
competence relates to ships exercising navigation rights or freedoms recognized
by the Convention. Such a case would be subject to arbitration or adjudication in
accordance with Article 297(1) and, in particular, would normally involve an
allegation that the coastal state has violated provisions regarding the freedoms
and rights of navigation. On the other hand, the situation with respect to coastal
state fisheries jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone is, in essence, the
reverse.
Vessel Release under the General Dispute Settlement Provisions
Even in the absence of a special procedure for securing compliance with the
provisions of the Convention regarding vessel release, the flag state could bring
the matter before a tribunal having jurisdiction under the general dispute
settlement provisions of the Convention, namely section 2 of Part XV. The relief
requested could be release of the vessel and crew as required by the Convention.
Pursuant to Article 290, the flag state could also request the tribunal to prescribe
provisional measures. The provisional measures requested could be release of the
vessel and crew on the grounds that their detention pendente lite constitutes an
irreparable injury.2 6 If the tribunal "considers that primafacieit has jurisdiction"
it "may prescribe any provisional measure which it considers appropriate under
the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or
to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision".
The parties must comply promptly.
Urgency is the basic characteristic of situations that may require a tribunal to
25

While Arts. 61 to 73 of the Convention contain detailed conservation, management and
enforcement limitations on coastal state authority with respect to living resources in the

exclusive economic zone, such limitations are not specified with respect to the living resources of
the territorial sea or, by virtue of Arts. 68 and 77(4), with respect to sedentary species of the
continental shelf. The absence of an express reference to areas other than the exclusive economic
zone in Art. 297(3)(a) presumably reflects this facL
26 A relevant precedent would be the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice

directing Iran to ensure the immediate return of US premises and release of US detainees: United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (US v Iran) [1979] ICJ Rep 7, pp. 20-21

(Provisional Measures Order of 15 December).
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prescribe provisional measures. But an arbitral tribunal may be the only forum
with jurisdiction under section 2 of Part XV and the declarations of the parties. It
can take several months to constitute an arbitral tribunal, particularly if the state
being sued is less than. enthusiastic. 27 For this reason, Article 290(5) provides
that, failing agreement between the parties on another forum within two weeks
from the date of the request for provisional measures:
"Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being
submitted [under section 2], ... the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea ...may prescribe ...provisional measures ...if it considers that

prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction
and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the
tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or
affirm those provisional measures

....

The Vessel Release Procedure
The alternative special procedure for vessel release under Article 292 of the
Convention can be understood as an attempt to define an additional procedure
that is different -from, and presumably better tailored to the specific task, than
that which is available under the general dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention (including those concerning provisional measures).
Article 292 is one of only two articles in Part XV that does not contain the
word "dispute". 28 While one party's demand for release as required by the
Convention, and the other party's failure to release, normally would be
understood to constitute a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of the Convention, the absence of the word "dispute" suggests that the nature of
Article 292 is different from other provisions of Part XV. Its relationship to those
provisions must be analysed with care.
What is submitted to the court or tribunal under Article 292 is "the question of
release from detention". That question may be presented when "it is alleged that
the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for
the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond
or other financial security". The court or tribunal "shall deal only with the
question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the
appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew". The duty
of the detaining state is to "comply promptly with the decision of the court or
tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew ...[u]pon the posting of
the bond or other financial security determined by the court or tribunal".
The competence of a court or tribunal under Article 292 is extremely limited.
The sovereign rights or jurisdiction of the detaining state to arrest, try or punish
27 See Convention, Ann. VII, Art. 3; Ann. VIII, Art. 3.
28 The other is Art. 293 dealing with applicable law, which does however contain the word "case".
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the vessel or crew are not at issue. 29 The existence and exercise of prescriptive,
enforcement or adjudicative competence are not at issue. Liability for damages is
not at issue. While the remedy of release, even without bond, would be a proper
exercise of the power to prescribe provisional measures under Article 290 in any
case where appropriate to preserve the respective rights of the parties pendente
lite, under Article 292 the question of release may be submitted only if the
Convention requires prompt release upon the posting of a reasonable bond or
other financial security. The relevant language is drawn from the release
provisions of Articles 73 and 226.
Because it limits significantly what is at stake, the restricted competence of a
court or tribunal under Article 292 may permit greater speed and flexibility. This
is in fact the case.
Article 290 requires that a request for provisional measures be made in
connection with a dispute submitted to a court or.tribunal having jurisdiction
under section 2 and the declarations of the parties. In this connection, a court or
tribunal prescribing provisional measures must consider "that primafacie it has
jurisdiction ' 30 over the parties and the dispute under the Convention. 3 1 That
question, as well as the question of the need for provisional measures and the
urgency of that need, might be affected by the question of whether local remedies
have been exhausted in municipal courts.3 2 The procedure may be further
complicated if the case involves coastal state jurisdiction and the respondent

29 The release provision of Art. 226(i)(b) assumes that the investigation by the detaining state
indicates that applicable regulations have been violated by the ship or crew.
30 At least in textual terms, this is a more stringent requirement than that articulated by the
International Court of Justice, which has indicated provisional measures when the instrument
invoked by the applicant appears prima facie to afford "a possible basis upon which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be founded": Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Iceland; FRG v
Iceland), [1972] ICJ Rep 12, 15-16 (Interim Protection Order of 17 August) (citation to
companion opinion omitted). This standard, albeit without the word "possible", has been
repeated by the Court in numerous cases since then. It was analysed by the late Judge Jim~nez de
Ar&chaga in "International Law in the Past Third Century", (1978) 159 Rec. des Cours 1, 161,
and by Judge Schwebel in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaraguav US), [1984] ICJ Rep 169, 206-207 (Provisional Measures Order of 10 May) (Sep.
Op. Schwebel, J.).
3i Where the dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal that has yet to be constituted, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea may not prescribe provisional measures unless "it
considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction".
32 See Convention, Art. 295. Where release of a vessel or crew is the provisional measure requested,
the respondent might argue that the question of release and bond is currently before its own trial
or appellate courts, and that municipal courts should be given a reasonable time to arrive at a
decision. In the Interhandelcase, the International Court of Justice, observing that there was no
indication that US courts would reach a speedy conclusion, declined to indicate provisional
measures in anticipation of a final judgment in the US courts adverse to Swiss interests:
Interhandel (Switzerlandv US), [1957] ICJ Rep 105, 112 (Interim Protection Order of 24
October). While the Interhandelcase is certainly distinguishable from a situation in which a ship
or its crew are being detained, it does illustrate the fact that proceedings in municipal courts may
be relevant to the question of whether and when to prescribe provisional measures.
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exercises its right to request a preliminary determination that the claim
constitutes an abuse of legal process or prima facie is unfounded.3 3
Article 292 does not require that a request for vessel release be made in
connection with a dispute submitted to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under section 2 and the declarations of the parties. Nor does it require that the
application for release be submitted to a court or tribunal that has jurisdiction
under the other provisions of section 2. If the parties fail to agree on a forum
within 10 days from the time of detention, 34 the application for release may be
submitted "to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under article
287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea". This gives the
35
applicant a reasonable choice and helps avoid jurisdictional issues.
Although urgency is a basic characteristic of a situation requiring provisional
measures, Article 290 refers explicitly to this fact only in what is arguably a
negative sense. In a case in which the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea has been requested to prescribe provisional measures pending the
constitution of an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Tribunal may do so only "if it considers ... that the urgency of the situation so
requires". Although the need for urgent consideration of a request for
provisional measures is implicitly recognized by the fact that the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is authorized to prescribe provisional measures
soon after it receives the request if an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over the
dispute is not yet constituted, by the fact that a five-member chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is authorized to prescribe
provisional members if the Tribunal is not in session or a quorum is not
present, 36 and by the procedural priority accorded requests for provisional
measures in the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice, 37 the
Convention does not explicitly command urgency or priority for requests for
provisional measures.
Article 292 expressly permits an application for release to be filed after 10 days
following detention and requires that the court or tribunal deal with the
application for release "without delay". Insofar as vessel release proceedings are
33 Convention, Art. 294.

3 The waiting period before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea may indicate
provisional measures is "two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures" in a
case where an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over the dispute is not yet constituted:
Convention, Art. 290(5).
3 In this regard it is interesting to note that the question of release may be submitted to the
International Court of Justice under Art. 292 if the respondent has accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court in its declaration under Art. 287. Under Art. 290, an application for provisional
measures may not be submitted to the Court unless it has jurisdiction over the dispute; the Court
has jurisdiction over the dispute under Art. 287 only if both the applicant and the respondent
have accepted its jurisdiction in their declarations.
36 Convention, Ann. VI, Art. 25(2).
37 The Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice provide that a request for provisional
measures "shall have priority over all other cases" and that the Court "shall be convened
forthwith for the purpose of proceeding to a decision on the request as a matter of urgency".
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concerned, there is no lack of persuasive arguments that Article 295 does not
require exhaustion of local remedies, that Article 294 regarding preliminary
proceedings is not relevant, and that other provisions of Part XV that might
frustrate or delay the proceedings are inapposite. But the analysis is simplified by
the reference to the 10-day period and the command to proceed "without delay"
and "deal only with the question of release". These clauses, as well as the absence
of the term "dispute", provide the court or tribunal with an intrinsic textual basis
in Article 292 itself for concluding that such requirements do not apply to vesselrelease applications, and minimize the need to engage in complex analyses of the
meaning, scope and purpose of other provisions of Part XV.
Applications "on behalf of" the Flag State
An application for release may be made only "by or on behalf of the flag state of
the vessel". 38 Article 292 is the only provision of the Convention that contains
such a formulation. In order to appreciate its import, one may compare the two
alternatives it offers.
Under ordinary concepts of standing, there is nothing unusual about the
notion that an application for release of the ship or the crew may be made by the
flag state. The exclusive standing accorded the flag state in this regard is also not
particularly surprising.
In connection with an application made by it, the flag state is free to select
representatives, agents or counsel of its choice to appear before a court or
tribunal. They may be, and frequently are, private attorneys hired for the specific
case, rather than government officials. There is no prohibition on the owner or
operator of the ship, or any other person, assisting the flag state in the selection
or remuneration of representatives, agents or counsel who appear in connection
with an application for release made by the flag state. The fact that they are
authorized to appear will presumably be indicated by naming them in official
documents transmitted to the court or tribunal in connection with the particular
proceedings instituted by the application.
Redundancy should not be presumed. A text that provides that an application
for release may be made "by or on behalf of" the flag state should be interpreted
to give meaning to the fact that it offers alternatives. The words "on behalf of"
provide an option that is not provided by the word "by". One would deny those
words alternative effect were one to interpret the term "on behalf of' to mean
only that the flag state may name a specific individual or individuals to appear
on its behalf in official documents transmitted to the court or tribunal in
connection with each application for release. The flag state can (and to some
degree must) do that in actions brought "by" it.
In this connection, it should be recalled that an application for release under
Article 292 may be brought before a court or tribunal that does not have
38
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jurisdiction over disputes between the flag state and the respondent state under
the other provisions of Part XV, that only the question of release may be
addressed by the court or tribunal, and that urgency is the essence of the release
procedure. This suggests that a flag state might rationally decide that a
governmental decision in connection with each application for release is
unnecessary and may entail undesirable delay and expense. It might also prefer
a procedure that minimizes the expenditure of governmental resources, and that
leaves it to the private parties concerned to pursue release. In that connection,
the private party would have to weigh the costs to it of vessel release proceedings
in assessing its willingness to provide a bond or financial security in the amount
fixed by the detaining state.
To have real alternative effect, the words "on behalf of" should be understood
to permit the flag state to dispense with the need for official communications
from its government in connection with each application for release. The flag
state, if it wishes, may designate in advance natural or juridical persons, by name
or by class, who are authorized to bring applications for release on its behalf. It
might designate, for example, the owners or operators of detained vessels, a
shipping association, or a labour union. Since no application for release may be
made on behalf of the flag state against its will, the flag state may change, qualify
or withdraw its designations.
It should be sufficient that the court or tribunal have in its possession an
authentic copy of the law, regulation,, or other official act of the flag state
designating the persons or class of persons authorized to bring an application for
release on its behalf, and documentation establishing that the ship is registered in
the state concerned and that the person making the application for release on
behalf of the flag state is a person referred to in the law, regulation, or other
official act of the flag state. In addition, a person making an application on
behalf of the flag state might be required to certify that a copy of the application
and supporting documentation has been delivered to a government minister or
other competent official of the flag state, and to indicate the name and title of the
official concerned and the date, time and place that delivery was effected. The
flag state could of course impose additional notice and information requirements
on its designees.
Such an approach would be consistent with the negotiating history of Article
292. The United States and certain other states supported access by private
parties to dispute settlement tribunals under the Convention in a number of
circumstances, including vessel release. They were successful in the case of deep
sea-bed mining. 39 They were successful in establishing that the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is open to entities other than States Parties
pursuant to any agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal.4 0 By agreeing
to the "by or on behalf of" formula, they compromised with those reluctant to
39 Convention, Arts. 187, 188, 190.
40 Convention, Ann. VI, Art. 20.
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accept private access on a text designed to permit the flag state to authorize
private access in fact while maintaining the form of a state-to-state proceeding.
Precisely what was negotiated might be considered in the light of Article 190 of
the Convention. The relationship between a deep sea-bed mining company and
its sponsoring state under Part XI of the Convention is analogous to the
relationship between a shipowner and the flag state, but was not conceived to be
as comprehensive in part because the mining company has a direct contractual
relationship with the Sea-Bed Authority under the Convention. Nevertheless,
even in that context, it was necessary to include provisions in Article 190 dealing
with the right of the sponsoring state to intervene, and the right of a respondent
state to request the intervention of the sponsoring state, where a private mining
company is a party to a dispute. The Article also reveals the sensitivity of certain
states to the idea of being sued by a private party in an international tribunal: if
the sponsoring state does not intervene at the request of the respondent state, the
respondent state "may arrange to be represented by a juridical person of its
nationality".
In the case of vessel release, had the owner or operator of a ship been accorded
a right of direct access, the flag state probably would have been accorded a right
of intervention and the detaining state probably would have been accorded a
right at least to request such intervention. The real choice therefore was between
a system in which there is effective private access unless the flag state and
perhaps the respondent state objects, and a system in which there is effective
private access if the flag state affirmatively authorizes it. The Convention opts
for the latter and, by maintaining the form of an action "on behalf of' the flag
state, accommodates the sensitivities of respondent states.
This system poses no jurisdictional problems for the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea. In principle, it is not closed to private parties. The
Convention is its constituent instrument, and the Convention authorizes it to
hear vessel-release applications made by or on behalf of the flag state.
There is, however, a question concerning vessel-release applications filed with
the International Court of Justice. Because only states may be parties to cases
before the Court, 41 it may be more sensitive to the questions posed by
applications brought "on behalf of" the flag state. On the other hand, the Court
might see the emergence of this formula in a globally negotiated and widely
ratified Convention as a timely invitation by states to allow some flexibility in
interpreting the Statute in this regard.
The Private Bar
It is too early to tell how often the vessel release procedures of the Convention
will be used. Because of the delays inherent in constituting an arbitral tribunal, it
is likely that virtually all applications will be made either to the International
41
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Court of Justice or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Of the
two, the Tribunal is available to all applicants, while the Court is available only if
the detaining state accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
in its declaration pursuant to Article 247.
If vessel-release applications are referred to a Chamber of the Tribunal in
much the same way as requests for provisional measures, 42 the result could well
be a forum that is more readily available. It remains to be seen whether the
Tribunal's rules may facilitate the vessel-release procedure along these lines, or
whether the parties to the Convention, in allocating expenses of the Tribunal
among themselves, will create incentives for the use of chambers.
It is also too early to tell how many flag states will authorize vessel owners or
others to make applications for release on their behalf. In the case of major flag
states the answer may depend on the advice they receive from the shipping
attorneys they consult. It is by no means clear that many of those attorneys are
aware of the opportunity presented by such legislation to help shipowners enjoy
the benefits of the vessel-release remedy without the need for a decision in each
case by the flag state, and the concomitant opportunity to relieve the flag state of
the financial and other burdens associated with the need to bring each release
proceeding itself.
The urgency associated with vessel release suggests that lawyers will be sought
who are in a position to file applications quickly, persuade a tribunal to proceed
quickly, and of course win. When the application is filed by a private person "on
behalf of" the flag state, it is likely that private attorneys will be hired and paid
by that person. But this may be the case, at least to some extent, even where the
application is made "by" the flag state. Detaining states are also free to hire
private counsel if they wish.
The legal questions likely to arise most frequently concern the amount of the
bond or other financial security that must be posted and, at least on occasion,
whether more time is reasonably required for investigation prior to release.
Particular cases may pose the question of whether release of a ship has been
properly refused or made conditional on proceeding to a repair yard because the
ship is not seaworthy or poses an unreasonable threat of damage to the marine
environment. Some attorneys in law enforcement agencies of government and
some members of the private bar specializing in admiralty, criminal law or
environmental law may have considerable experience in dealing with these kinds
of questions.
There is no reason to doubt that the German Government will permit parties
before the Tribunal to be represented by counsel of their choice, without regard
to the country in which counsel is licensed to practise law, if any. Counsel and
their assistants presumably will be permitted to arrive in Hamburg some time
before a case is scheduled to be heard, to lease residential and office space and
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amenities, and to remain and work in Hamburg while the case is under
consideration and for a reasonable time thereafter.
An interesting question that emerged in discussions organized by the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen in the spring of 1995 is whether foreign
counsel, not otherwise authorized to practise law in Hamburg, will be permitted
to maintain an office in Hamburg even when they are not working on a case
before the International Tribunal, if the purpose of that office is to advise clients
with respect to the Tribunal and represent them before the Tribunal. If so, it
would be interesting to consider what restraints, if any, would apply to their
efforts to obtain clients with business before the Tribunal.
The legal argument that such activity should be permitted would, in principle,
reflect a functional point of view regarding regulation of the bar: counsel is not,
from the Hamburg office, practising German law (or any other municipal law) or
appearing before German courts (or other municipal courts) or seeking German
clients (at least as such), but is maintaining an office solely for the purpose of
practising public international law before an International Tribunal located in
Hamburg where, with few exceptions, only states may be parties to cases. The legal
argument that such activity should not be permitted would, in principle, reflect a
nationalist point of view regarding regulation of the bar: only lawyers licensed by
Germany (or its European Union partners) may set up a law office in Germany.
Either argument is consistent with territorial sovereignty. No one argues that
foreigners may operate a law office in Hamburg without the consent of the
competent German authorities. The question is whether Germany ought to
consent or has consented, by treaty or otherwise.
It is probably a mistake to analyse this question in terms of Germany's
international obligations as such, present or proposed. Few if any states are
likely to press Germany to assume such obligations. For some time, the question
is likely to be more theoretical and symbolic than real. Some states are likely to
watch and wait before agreeing to submit cases to the Tribunal or accepting its
compulsory jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in the Convention, namely
vessel release, provisional measures, and deep sea-bed mining disputes. Without
the prospect of attracting clients, lawyers are unlikely to rush in.
At least for the present, the real question is whether Germany wishes to
promote the development of the idea that Hamburg is a global centre for legal
activity related to the international law of the sea, using the presence of the
International Tribunal as a focal point. Some states find it in their interests to
adopt special entry, visa, and customs procedures for foreign shipping and
products and related personnel and activities in order to develop trade in their
ports. A similar logic may apply to foreign lawyers with an interest in practising
before the Tribunal, or perhaps even with a broader interest in the sea.
If there are free ports, there may be free cities with respect to the international
law of the sea and perhaps some international aspects of maritime law. As its
name and history suggest, the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg might be a
logical place to consider the idea.

